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NOTES AND COMMENTS

LEGISLATION
"SKIP ELECTION LAW" OF 1941 HELD INVALID
LEGISLATION

SPECIAL

The legislature enacted a statute which postponed elections' of
officials for all cities and school cities in the state except those
of the first class. The enactment was attacked as being in violation
of constitutional provisions forbidding the passing of special legislation
on certain enumerated subjects and on any subject where a general act
could be made applicable. Held, the act was special legislation in violation of the constitution. Ettinger et al. v. Sturdevent, Hole et al. -v.
Dice, 38 N.E. (2d) 1000, (Ind. 1942).
The Indiana legislature is forbidden to enact special laws in regard
to 17 enumerated subjects; IND. CONST., Art. IV, § 22; and special
legislation can not be enacted in any case where a general law would
be applicable; IND. CONST. Art. IV, § 22. The matter of municipal
elections is not one on which special legislation is expressly forbidden,
thus the present statute, Cr. 86, Acts 1941, IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns,
Supp. 1942) § 29-1813 et seq., can be invalidated only on the grounds
that a general law could be made applicable.
Under the doctrine of Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 409 (1868), and
a long line of cases which followed it, Indianapolis V. Navin, 151 Ind.
139, 47 N.E. 525 (1898); Wade v. Beasley, 143 Ind. 306, 42 N.E. 727
(1895); State v. Kolsem, 130 Ind. 434, 29 N.E. 595 (1891). Contra:
Thomas v. Clay County, 5 Ind. 4 (1854); Fountain Park v. Hensler,
199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465 (1926), the legislature was the sole judge
of whether or not a general law could be applicable. This doctrine,
however, was forsaken for the view that the matter was a proper
subject of judicial review. Heckler v. Conter, 206 Ind. 187 N.E. 878
(1933). Contra: Groves v. Lake County, 209 Ind. 371, 199 N.E. 137
(1936). This more recent and better stand is followed by the court
in the present case.
It has been generally held that subjects may be classified for
legislative purposes as long as (1) the classification is reasonable,
Fountain Park v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465 (1926), Longview
v. City of Crawfordsville, 164 Ind. 117, 73 N.E. 78 (1904), and (2)
the act is applicable to all within the class. Spencer v. Knight, 177
Ind. 564, 98 N.E. 342 (1911); Strange v. Board of County Comrs., 173
Ind. 640, 91 N.E. 242 (1910). It is further held that the limits of the
class must not be such as to exclude others from the class forever.
Rosecrans v. Evansville, 194 Ind. 499, 143 N.E. 593 (1923). However,
the fact that there is at the time of enactment only one city within a
class made the subject of legislation does not render the act invalid
as special legislation. Bumb v. Evansville, 168 Ind. 272, 80 N.E. 625
(1907).
In the past the court has not been consistent where the problem
of special legislation has been involved, and the result is almost hopeless confusion. Horack, Special Legislation: Another Twilight Zone
(1936) 12 IND. L. T. 109, 183.
The Court refers to both section 22 and 23 but fails to distinguish
between them in regard to applicability here. Since section 22 is not
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involved, the real issue is whether or not a general law could be made
applicable, and this problem is virtually ignored. The Court contents
itself with saying that the act is invalid because the bases of the
classification are arbitrary. It is unfortunate that the connection
between this fact and the problem of whether a general law could
be made applicable was not clearly shown.
However, it is submitted that the result in the present case is a
correct one. As the Court said, the classification was arbitrary, i.e.,
it had no connection with the purpose of the act. Therefore, the
classification could be destroyed without preventing or hindering accomplishment of the act's purpose. If this is true, it seems clear that
a general law could be made applicable, and the act contravenes Section 23.

LEGISLATION
SEPARABILITY CLAUSES
A statute deferred the time for election of all officers of cities
and school cities, but exempted first class cities from its operation.
It contained a separability clause providing that if any part of the
act should be declared invalid, such decision would not invalidate the
remainder. Held, that the classification was unreasonable and special
legislation,' and that the exemption alone could not be elided, so
2
the entire act is unconstitutional.
To determine whether an entire act should be declared void in toto
or whether the objectionable exemption could be stricken, courts attempt to determine the legislative intent.3 Rules of interpretation declare that: (1) if a construction can be given the statute which will
not render it unconstitutional, that construction should be adopted; 4
1.
2.

3.

4.

See note (1942) 18 Ind. L.J.
Ettinger et al. v. Studevant, Hale et al. v. Dice, Ind., 38
N. 1,,. (2d) 1000 (1942). As originally submitted the bill was of
uniform operation over the entire state. The original bill was
referred to a committee, and there the exception and the separability clause were added contemporaneously. See Ind. Stat.
Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1940) § 29-1813 et seq.
Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U.S. 90 (1886); State ex rel. Collett
v. Gorby, 122 Ind. 17, 23 N.E. 678 (1890); Kelley v. Ohio, 6 Ohio
S. 269 (1856); accord, State ex rel. Monnett v. Baker, 50 Ohio 1,
44 N.E. 516 (1896); State ex rel. Brown v. Honey, 190 Wis. 285,
208 N.W. 591 (1926); Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. McCormack,
174 Tenn. 327, 125 S.W. (2d) 151 (1939). There has been much
criticism of the doctrine of "legislative intent," but this seems
to be the best instrument for interpretation of statutes when
liberally applied in view of a thorough and critical analysis of
the factual situation. The "legislative intent" is not a tangible, easily
determined thing, but is a device which may well be compared
to that of the "reasonable man" in the law of negligence. Horack,
In the Name of Legislative Intention (1932) 38 W. Va. L. Q. 119.
Taggart v. Claypool, 145 Ind. 590, 44 N.E. 18 (1896); City of
Indianapolis v. Bieler, 138 Ind. 30, 36 N.E. 857 (1893) (overruled
by principal case); Weco Products v. Reed Drug Co., 225 Wis.
474, 274 N.W. 426 (1937).

